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Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition 
 
ABSTRACT: Externalist theories of justification create the possibility of cases in 
which everything appears to one relevantly similar with respect to two 
propositions, and yet one proposition is justified and the other is not. Internalists 
find this difficult to accept, because it seems irrational in such a case to affirm 
one proposition and not the other. The underlying internalist intuition supports a 
specific internalist theory, Phenomenal Conservatism, on which epistemic 
justification is conferred by appearances. 
 
1. The Internalism/Externalism Divide 
 
Epistemic internalism and externalism may be understood either as views about 
the nature of knowledge, or as views about the nature of epistemic justification.1 
The focus of this paper will be on epistemic justification. In the following, a 
particular counter-intuitive consequence of externalist theories of justification is 
identified, one whose implausibility forms the core of the case for internalism. 
The argument for internalism is then extended to show that a particular theory of 
justification, Phenomenal Conservatism, is the preferred form of internalism, in 
that it is most faithful to the central internalist intuition. 
 Both internalists and externalists accept a certain supervenience thesis, to 
the effect that, when one is justified in believing a proposition, there are some 
conditions in virtue of which one is justified in believing it, some conditions that 
constitute or confer epistemic justification. Hereafter, a justification-conferring 
condition will be taken to be a non-redundant part of a sufficient condition on 
justification,2 although the arguments following can equally well be stated in 
terms of either necessary or sufficient conditions on justification. The dispute 
between internalists and externalists concerns whether these justification-
conferring conditions are—in a sense to be defined—entirely internal, or at least 
partly external. The following five accounts of the distinction invoke different 
interpretations of “internal” and “external” conditions:3 
 
Internal State Account: 
Internalism holds that all of the conditions that confer justification are 
internal to the subject’s mind (or: supervene on the subject’s mental 
states). 
Externalism holds that at least some of the conditions that confer 
justification are external to the subject’s mind (or: fail to supervene on the 
subject’s mental states). 
 
Actual Awareness Account: 
Internalism holds that all of the conditions that confer justification must be 
conditions that the subject is aware of. 
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Externalism holds that at least some of the conditions that confer 
justification may be conditions that the subject is unaware of. 
 
Potential Awareness Account: 
Internalism holds that all of the conditions that confer justification must be 
conditions that the subject can be aware of. 
Externalism holds that at least some of the conditions that confer 
justification may be conditions that the subject cannot be aware of. 
 
Introspectability Account: 
Internalism holds that all of the conditions that confer justification must be 
conditions that the subject can be introspectively aware of. 
Externalism holds that at least some of the conditions that confer 
justification may be conditions that the subject cannot be introspectively 
aware of. 
 
Appearance Account: 
Internalism holds that all of the conditions that confer justification 
supervene on how things seem to the subject. 
Externalism holds that at least some of the conditions that confer 
justification fail to supervene on how things seem to the subject. 
 
For reasons discussed below, the Appearance Account offers arguably the most 
interesting way of drawing the distinction. But there is no need at this point to 
attempt to adjudicate among these competing accounts of the distinction. 
 For illustrative purposes, it is worth looking at how each of the above 
accounts can be used to classify two particular epistemological views. Consider 
first the following paradigmatic externalist principle of justification: 
 
Reliabilism: 
S is justified in believing that p, if S formed the belief that p by a reliable 
method, S has no beliefs that either support ~p or support the proposition 
that S formed the belief that p by an unreliable method, and S has no 
available reliable belief-forming method that, if used, would have led S to 
believe that ~p.4 
 
This principle states a sufficient condition on justification, of which the reliability 
of S’s method of forming the belief that p is a non-redundant part. The reliability 
of S’s belief-forming method, in turn, is an external condition, in the sense that it 
does not supervene on the subject’s mental states, subjects may be unaware of 
whether it obtains, subjects may not even be in a position to become aware of 
whether it obtains, subjects are rarely if ever in a position to become 
introspectively aware of whether it obtains, and it is possible for things to appear 
the same to the subject in a case in which the condition obtains as they do in a 
case in which the condition does not obtain. Thus, this view seems to come out 
externalist on any account of externalism. 
 The following is a paradigmatic internalist view: 
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Phenomenal Conservatism: 
If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at 
least some degree of justification for believing that p.5 
 
The main justification-conferring condition in this theory is the condition of its 
seeming to one that p. This condition is internal in the sense that it is a mental 
state of one’s own; it is, plausibly, a condition that the subject can become aware 
of, and introspectively aware at that; and it supervenes on how things appear to 
the subject. It is unclear whether it satisfies the actual awareness requirement, but 
if it does not, then the Actual Awareness account of internalism should be rejected 
as saddling internalists with a needlessly implausible view. This is because if even 
its seeming to one that p does not count as an internal condition—perhaps because 
subjects need not have second-order representations of their own seemings—then 
there will be precious few, if any, internal conditions for the Actual Awareness 
Internalist to rely on; it seems equally plausible (or implausible) to hold that 
subjects may lack awareness of their beliefs, perceptual experiences, and other 
mental states as that they may lack awareness of how things appear to them.6 
 The no-defeater condition alluded to in the statement of Phenomenal 
Conservatism is perhaps harder to classify. But if defeaters themselves are 
characterized in terms of how things appear to the subject, or the subject’s beliefs, 
or something generally along those lines, then the no-defeater condition will be 
similarly internal. Thus, Phenomenal Conservatism seems to come out as an 
internalist theory on any plausible account of internalism. 
 
2. The Central Internalist Intuition 
 
Suppose that some condition, E, is external in one of the senses delineated above 
and is a non-redundant part of some sufficient condition, C, on justification. It 
seems very likely, then, that it would be possible to construct a case in which, for 
some person S and some propositions p and q, 
 
i) S satisfies E with respect to p but not with respect to q; 
ii) S satisfies all the other parts of C, with respect to each of p and q; 
iii) S does not satisfy any sufficient condition on justification other than C, 
with respect to either p or q; and 
iv) It seems to S that he is in the same epistemic position with respect to p as 
he is in with respect to q, and S has no reason for suspecting that either 
proposition is more justified or more likely to be true than the other. 
 
 For example, suppose that Reliabilism is a correct statement of a sufficient 
condition on justification. Then “the method by which S formed the belief that p 
is reliable” is an external condition that is a non-redundant part of a sufficient 
condition on justification. Now imagine the following scenario. 
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The Clairvoyant Brain: 
Susan has two interesting ways of forming beliefs: apparent sensory 
perception, and clairvoyance. Susan, unfortunately, is a brain in a vat, and 
her sense perception is entirely unreliable, although she has no reason to 
suspect this, and it seems to her that her sense perception is just as reliable 
as her clairvoyance. It also seems to her that her perceptual beliefs are 
adequately justified, just as much as her clairvoyant beliefs. Nor has she 
any reason to doubt any of this. Oddly enough, Susan actually has psychic 
powers, and her clairvoyance is highly reliable. One day, Susan seems to 
see a dog in front of her and has no special reason to doubt the dog’s 
reality. She also has a clairvoyant experience of a purple unicorn grazing 
in a field somewhere, with no special reason to doubt the unicorn’s reality. 
In fact, there is no relevant dog of the sort she seems to perceive, but there 
is a real unicorn that she is accurately detecting clairvoyantly.7 
 
In this scenario, 
 
i') Susan has a reliable belief-forming method that tells her that there is a 
purple unicorn, and (only) an unreliable method that tells her that there is a 
dog; 
ii') Susan has no beliefs and no other reliable belief-forming methods that 
would cast doubt on the existence of either the unicorn or the dog, nor on 
the reliability of either her sense perception or her clairvoyance; 
iii') Susan does not (according to the Reliabilist) have any other source of 
justification for believing in either the unicorn or the dog, apart from 
satisfying Reliabilism;8 and 
iv') It seems to Susan that she has just as much reason for believing in the dog 
as she has for believing in the unicorn, that the former belief would be just 
as reliable as the latter, and in general, that she is epistemically no worse 
positioned with respect to the proposition that there is a dog than she is 
with respect to the proposition that there is a unicorn. Susan has no reason 
to doubt any of this, nor any reason to think that it is any more likely that 
the unicorn exists than that the dog exists. 
 
If Reliabilism is a correct theory, then Susan would be justified in believing that 
the purple unicorn exists, but unjustified in believing that the dog exists.9 
Internalists will find this counter-intuitive. To see why, consider things from 
Susan’s point of view. It seems that, if one has adequate justification for believing 
that p and none for believing that q, it follows that one rationally should (or at 
least may) believe that p while refraining from believing that q. In addition, it 
seems that, at least normally, including in scenarios like the above, a rational 
person might recognize and report their own doxastic situation. Thus, Susan might 
say something like the following to one of the people in her virtual world; call 
remarks of this form the Absurd Speech: 
 
Absurd Speech: 
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I seem to be aware of a dog, just as I seem to be aware of a unicorn. These 
two experiences seem equally reliable to me, and in general, seem alike in 
all epistemically relevant respects. However, I believe that there is a 
unicorn, and I do not believe that there is a dog. I have no reason to think 
that the unicorn experience is any more likely to be accurate than the dog 
experience; I just accept the content of the one and not the other, for no 
apparent reason. 
 
On Reliabilism, the above would be a rational thing for Susan to say—or, more 
importantly, would (if true) be a report of an epistemically rational state of mind. 
But the Absurd Speech is not a rational thing to say. Nor is this a matter merely of 
the propriety of asserting what the Absurd Speech asserts; even to think to oneself 
what the Absurd Speech says would be a mark of irrationality.10 
 The claim that if Reliabilism is true, the Absurd Speech is rational, does 
not rest on any strong internalist assumptions, such as that individuals are always 
aware of their own mental states or of what constitutes a reason for what. It 
requires only that, in a situation of the kind described, Susan might rationally 
make a correct report of her mental state, including how things seem to her, what 
she believes and does not believe, and what she has or lacks reason for thinking. 
Although there exist situations in which a person is not in a position to correctly 
and justifiedly report some of their own mental states, there is no reason for an 
externalist to deny that Susan could be in a position so to report her mental states 
in the sort of situation we are imagining; there is no reason, for example, for 
denying that Susan might have a reliable introspective mechanism. 
 But perhaps if externalism is true, Susan might be unaware of some of the 
reasons for belief that she has, or might justifiably make false judgements about 
what reasons she has. For example, Susan might not be in a position to recognize 
(a) that the actual reliability of her clairvoyance, coupled with the actual 
unreliability of her sensory experiences, is a reason for thinking that her unicorn 
experience is more likely to be true than her dog experience, or (b) simply that the 
occurrence of her unicorn experience is a reason for believing that there is a 
unicorn, while the occurrence of her dog experience is not a reason for believing 
that there is a dog. If so, then the Absurd Speech is an incorrect report of Susan’s 
situation; specifically, Susan speaks falsely in saying, “I have no reason to think 
that the unicorn experience is any more likely to be true than the dog experience.” 
Even so, Susan would be justified in saying what she does and justified in her 
doxastic attitudes towards the dog and the unicorn, and this is counter-intuitive. 
Moreover, we can modify the Absurd Speech as follows, resulting in remarks that 
the Reliabilist is committed to regarding as both true and justified: 
 
I seem to be aware of a dog, just as I seem to be aware of a unicorn. These 
two experiences seem equally reliable to me, and in general, seem alike in 
all epistemically relevant respects. However, I believe that there is a 
unicorn, and I do not believe that there is a dog. I don’t seem to have any 
reason to think that the unicorn experience is any more likely to be 
accurate than the dog experience; I just accept the content of the one and 
not the other, for no apparent reason. 
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Again, this does not seem to be a possible accurate report of a rational state of 
mind. 
 The preceding argument suggests a natural characterization of the central 
intuition of internalism about justification. It is that there cannot be a pair of cases 
in which everything seems to a subject to be the same in all epistemically relevant 
respects, and yet the subject ought, rationally, to take different doxastic attitudes 
in the two cases—for instance, in one case to affirm a proposition and in the other 
to withhold. 
 What is it for things to seem the same “in all epistemically relevant 
respects”? In the Clairvoyant Brain case, Susan experiences two appearances: one 
of a dog, and another of a unicorn. These appearances are not the same in all 
respects, since, for one thing, they have different contents. But this difference in 
their contents is not epistemically relevant—that is, it could not plausibly be 
maintained that Susan is either more or less justified in relying on her perceptual 
experience than on her clairvoyant experience because the one experience is of a 
dog while the other is of a unicorn. On the other hand, such features as the clarity 
and firmness of the two appearances, how well each coheres with other 
appearances, and the presence or absence of second-order appearances (such as 
the appearance that one or another appearance is reliable), are plausibly taken to 
be epistemically relevant. In the Clairvoyant Brain case, by stipulation, those sorts 
of factors are comparable for the two appearances—that is, the dog and unicorn 
appearances are equally clear and firm for Susan, they cohere equally well with 
other appearances, they seem to Susan to be equally reliable, and so on. It is in 
that sense that things seem the same to Susan, with respect to the proposition that 
there is a dog and the proposition that there is a unicorn, in all epistemically 
relevant respects. The reliabilist nevertheless rules the one proposition justified 
and the other unjustified. 
 All externalist theories of justification apparently permit the construction 
of cases of this kind. To see why, consider the characterizations of the 
internalism/externalism dispute from section 1 above. On the Internal State 
Account, the externalist will presumably affirm that there could be two cases in 
which a subject’s mental states are relevantly the same, but the subject has 
justification for belief in one case and not in the other, because of a difference in 
some factor external to the mind. On the Actual Awareness (Potential Awareness, 
Introspectability) Account, the externalist will affirm that there could be two cases 
in which everything the subject is aware of (can be aware of, can be 
introspectively aware of) is relevantly the same, but the subject has justification in 
one case and not in the other, because of a difference in some factor the subject is 
unaware of (cannot be aware of, cannot be introspectively aware of). In each of 
these cases, it seems that the external factor in question would not, or at least need 
not, affect how anything appears to the subject. Of course, the point is clearest on 
the Appearance Account of the internalism/externalism distinction; on this 
account, externalism is essentially defined as a view according to which it is 
possible to have pairs of cases of the problematic kind, in which all appearances 
are relevantly the same but justification is present in the one case and not the 
other.11 The Appearance Account is perhaps the most illuminating because it so 
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directly connects the definition of “internalism” with the central intuition behind 
internalism. 
 
3. An Extension of the Argument: The Acquaintance Theory 
 
The argument of section 2 can be extended to some theories that might be 
considered internalist. The Acquaintance Theory of Non-Inferential Justification 
is one such theory. A simple version of the theory is the following. 
 
Simple Acquaintance Theory: 
S has non-inferential justification for believing that p, if and only if S is 
acquainted with the fact that p. 
 
Acquaintance is taken to be a sui generis relation that one may stand in to a fact, a 
kind of direct awareness of the fact. Note that one’s being acquainted with the fact 
that p entails that p is true (“acquaintance” is factive). Typically, advocates of 
acquaintance theories take the possible objects of acquaintance to include (facts 
about) one’s own mental states and certain abstract objects.12 
 One problem for the Simple Acquaintance Theory is the problem of 
fallibility: we are fallible in all our major kinds of beliefs, including introspective 
and intuitive beliefs. Thus, suppose that you are simultaneously acquainted with 
two distinct pains. It seems to you that they are equally intense, and you have no 
reason for doubting this. However, one of the pains is in fact slightly less intense 
than the other. (The fallibility of your introspective sense is particularly 
understandable if the pains are of different kinds, though it is possible even if they 
are pains of the same kind.13) The next day, you are in a similar situation, except 
that this time, the two pains are actually equally intense, and you are directly 
acquainted with this fact. Presumably, this—the equal intensity of two present, 
conscious pains—is the sort of thing with which one might be acquainted, 
according to acquaintance theorists. In neither case do you have any defeaters for 
the relevant proposition, nor have you any ulterior justification for either 
proposition. 
 According to the Simple Acquaintance Theory, you lack justification for 
believing that the pains are equally intense on the first occasion, since you lack 
genuine acquaintance with their being equally intense, but you have justification 
for believing the pains are equally intense in the second case. So you should 
withhold judgement in the first case and believe in the second case. You do so, 
and you retain the relevant states of withholding and believing after all the pains 
are over. You then say: 
 
I think that the second pair of pains were equally intense, but I don’t think 
the first pair were. The first pair seemed to me to be equally intense, just as 
the second pair did, and I have no reason for doubting this, nor any reason 
to think the second introspection would be more reliable than the first. I 
just believe in the one case and not in the other, for no apparent reason. 
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Some readers may dispute the possibility of the case or my description of it. But it 
seems very likely that there are at least some possible cases in which a subject 
appears to be introspectively acquainted with a fact, lacks grounds for questioning 
his introspection, and yet is not actually acquainted with a relevant fact. This is all 
that the argument requires. In any such case, the Simple Acquaintance Theory 
would counsel one to eschew the relevant introspective belief, although said belief 
would appear to oneself to be relevantly similar to normal introspective beliefs 
that the Simple Acquaintance Theory approves of. 
 Doubtless many will find the Simple Acquaintance Theory too simple in 
any case. It is obviously ill-suited from the start to deal with the possibility of 
justified but mistaken intuitions and introspections, which most epistemologists 
would wish to recognize. How, if at all, might an acquaintance-based theory of 
non-inferential justification be modified to allow for this possibility? Here is one 
suggestion, derived from Richard Fumerton: 
 
Acquaintance/Similarity Theory: 
S has non-inferential justification for believing that p, if and only if S is 
acquainted with a fact that is sufficiently similar to the fact that p.14 
 
This view naturally raises questions about what will constitute sufficient 
similarity. But there is some initial plausibility to the thesis. It seems to explain 
the intuition that, in the pain cases described above, you were justified both times 
in believing that the pains were equally intense. What you were acquainted with in 
the first case might actually have been the fact that the two pains were almost 
equally intense, which is very similar to their being equally intense. So you were 
justified in believing that the two pains were equally intense. 
 My case against the Acquaintance/Similarity Theory turns on the 
possibility of cases that seem to the subject just like cases of acquaintance with a 
fact that p but that do not involve acquaintance with any fact that is genuinely 
similar to p. Consider the following example. 
 
Indignation/Resentment Case: 
Assume that indignation and resentment are distinct emotions, which 
people sometimes mistake for one another. Sam has a feeling of 
resentment, which falsely appears to him to be one of indignation. Imagine 
further that, although indignation and resentment seem very similar to 
Sam, they actually have a number of theoretically important 
dissimilarities; for instance, the capacities for the two emotions evolved 
independently, at different times in the history of our species; they serve 
different evolutionary functions; they have importantly different causes in 
the environment; they are proximately caused by (or realized in) different 
brain states; and they tend to lead to different behavior. For all of these 
reasons, in the completed scientific theory of the mind, they will be 
classified as very different emotions. Nevertheless, again, Sam finds it 
very difficult to distinguish them introspectively. 
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 The Acquaintance/Similarity Theory implies that Sam is not justified in 
believing that he feels indignation. Now suppose that the next day, Sam 
experiences a genuine case of indignation, with which he is acquainted, and which 
seems to him indistinguishable from his first experience, which was actually one 
of resentment. On the Acquaintance/Similarity Theory, Sam can rationally say, 
“Today, as yesterday, I seem to be experiencing indignation. Today’s emotion 
seems to me just like yesterday’s. But while I believe that I am experiencing 
indignation today, I do not believe I was experiencing indignation yesterday, 
although I have no reason to think my introspection today would be any more 
reliable than yesterday.” 
 We might avoid this scenario by replacing the Acquaintance/Similarity 
Theory with an Acquaintance/Apparent Similarity Theory: 
 
Acquaintance/Apparent Similarity Theory: 
S has non-inferential justification for believing that p, if and only if S is 
acquainted with a fact that appears to S to be similar to the fact that p. 
 
This seems to better capture what we were getting at with the 
Acquaintance/Similarity Theory. It is the fact that indignation and resentment 
seem similar to Sam—rather than that they are similar in an objective sense—that 
explains why his belief that he is feeling indignation is reasonable. But the 
Acquaintance/Apparent Similarity Theory is surely false; if S is acquainted with a 
fact that seems to him merely to be similar to the fact that p, but does not seem to 
actually be the fact that p, then presumably S would be irrational to believe that p 
on that basis. For example, suppose that on introspecting, Sam finds that he seems 
to be feeling resentment, and suppose that it also seems to him that this 
resentment is quite similar to indignation, though it does not seem to actually be 
indignation. Then Sam would be irrational to conclude that he is feeling 
indignation. 
 In short, fallibilistic acquaintance-based theories of non-inferential 
justification run into problems analogous to those facing epistemic externalism. 
Once one grants that one can be non-culpably mistaken about whether one is 
acquainted with the fact that p, the way is open for cases that are, to the subject, 
indistinguishable from genuine cases of acquaintance but are not in fact cases of 
acquaintance. An acquaintance-based theory of non-inferential justification will 
therefore rule it reasonable in some cases to accept one proposition while 
withholding or denying another, even though one can identify no relevant 
difference between the two propositions. 
 
4. Phenomenal Conservatism as the Preferred Form of Internalism 
 
Following the characterizations given in section 1 above, the following versions 
of epistemic internalism may be formulated. 
 
Internal State Internalism: All of the conditions that confer justification 
supervene on the subject’s mental states. 
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Actual Awareness Internalism: All of the conditions that confer justification must 
be conditions that the subject is aware of. 
 
Potential Awareness Internalism: All of the conditions that confer justification 
must be conditions that the subject can be aware of. 
 
Introspectability Internalism: All of the conditions that confer justification must 
be conditions that the subject can be introspectively aware of. 
 
Appearance Internalism: All of the conditions that confer justification supervene 
on how things seem to the subject. 
 
More than one of these versions of internalism may be true. Indeed, it is plausible 
that all of them save the Actual Awareness version are correct. Nevertheless, there 
is a point to asking which is the best formulation of internalism, in the sense of the 
formulation that best reflects the underlying motivation for epistemic internalism. 
There is reason to believe that the answer is the Appearance formulation. 
 The sort of intuitions invoked in sections 2 and 3 above seem to comprise 
the main underlying motivation for internalism. Externalist theories of 
justification countenance peculiar cases in which subjects rationally believe 
(disbelieve, withhold) some proposition yet are seemingly in no position to 
account for why they should believe (disbelieve, withhold) as they do. This is 
what internalists object to. A rational person, it seems, ought to be in a position, if 
he should come to reflect on his doxastic attitudes (that is, his attitudes of belief, 
disbelief, or suspended judgement toward various propositions), to approve those 
attitudes as justified—or at least he should not be in a position such that on 
reflection, he would or should disapprove of those attitudes. Such cases as that of 
the Clairvoyant Brain bring out externalism’s violation of this constraint. In the 
Clairvoyant Brain Case, it seems that Susan (the brain) is in no position to 
reflectively endorse both her credulity towards her clairvoyant experiences and her 
skepticism towards her sensory experiences; from her own point of view, the 
combination of attitudes must appear arbitrary and inexplicable. It therefore seems 
irrational of her to persist in those attitudes; yet that is what the externalist 
counsels. 
 Consider, now, how well each of the above versions of internalism reflects 
this core internalist intuition. Internal State Internalism fares poorly. It is not that 
Internal State Internalism is false—indeed, it is entailed by Appearance 
Internalism, given that appearances are mental states; but Internal State 
Internalism is not specific enough to explain why the Absurd Speech is absurd. 
Justification-conferring conditions do not merely supervene on subjects’ mental 
states; they supervene, more specifically, on how things appear. This is brought 
out by cases such as the Indignation/Resentment Case. There, we saw that what 
mattered was not so much what mental state Sam was in, as what mental state he 
appeared to himself to be in. When Sam shifted from feeling resentment on one 
day to feeling indignation on the next, this made no difference to what he was 
justified in believing, because things still appeared to him the same. An Internal 
State Internalism that does not embrace Appearance Internalism will mishandle 
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this sort of case—if, that is, we say that justification depends on mental states that 
do not supervene on how things seem to the subject, then we will be able to 
construct a pair of cases in which the subject has relevantly different mental states 
but yet things appear the same to the subject—and we will be forced to say that 
the subject ought to take different doxastic attitudes in the two cases. The subject 
will then be in a position to make a version of the Absurd Speech. This is just the 
sort of would-be possibility illustrated by the Indignation/Resentment Case. 
 Once we accept this, we can see that similar points apply to Actual 
Awareness, Potential Awareness, and Introspectability Internalism. Assuming that 
“awareness” is a success term, a change in what a subject is or can be aware of 
can be effected purely by a change in the actual facts, without any change in how 
things appear to the subject. This is illustrated, again, by the 
Indignation/Resentment Case, in which there is a difference in what the subject is 
and can be aware of, and specifically in what the subject can be introspectively 
aware of—on the first day, Sam lacks (actual or potential) introspective awareness 
of indignation, because the emotion he is feeling is not in fact indignation; but on 
the second day, he has introspective awareness of indignation. Yet this difference 
in what Sam is and can be introspectively aware of seems to make no difference to 
what Sam is justified in believing, because things appear to Sam the same. 
 In short, if we deny Appearance Internalism, then even if we embrace 
some other version of internalism, we will have to allow the possibility of pairs of 
cases in which everything seems to a subject the same in relevant respects but yet 
the subject is justified in believing in the one case and withholding or disbelieving 
in the other. Thus, the form of internalism supported by the argument of sections 2 
and 3 above is Appearance Internalism. 
 Now, what is the relationship between Appearance Internalism and 
Phenomenal Conservatism? Appearance Internalism articulates a constraint on 
justification-conferring conditions, and Phenomenal Conservatism identifies a 
particular justification-conferring condition that satisfies that constraint. 
Moreover, Phenomenal Conservatism is the most natural and plausible way to 
articulate such a condition. For, if appearances determine what we are justified in 
believing, then the most natural account of how they do that is that the appearance 
that p confers justification for believing that p—at least to some degree, and at 
least in the absence of defeaters. This does not rule out that appearances may also 
bear on justification in other ways—for instance, it does not rule out the principle 
that the appearance that a belief was formed in an unreliable way may defeat that 
belief’s justification. But it is very difficult to think of a plausible and natural 
epistemological principle that permits some beliefs to be justified in virtue of how 
things seem to the subject, without invoking the idea that the appearance that 
something is the case itself provides some sort of justification for believing that 
very thing. If a subject is to be justified in believing that p in virtue of the way 
things appear, what aspect of the appearances could be more relevant than the 
appearance that p is the case? And insofar as that is relevant, surely it is 
positively, rather than negatively relevant—surely, that is, we want to say that the 
appearance that p is the case contributes to p’s justification, as opposed to 
detracting from it. Other plausible connections between appearances and 
justification seem to be parasitic on Phenomenal Conservatism; thus, consider 
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again the view that a belief’s appearing to be formed in an unreliable way defeats 
its justification: it seems that this would only be true if the belief’s appearing to be 
formed in an unreliable way provided some degree of justification for thinking 
that it was formed in an unreliable way, which is a special case of Phenomenal 
Conservatism. 
 Something like Phenomenal Conservatism seems to underlie our intuitive 
reactions to the scenarios discussed above and to the various Absurd Speeches 
that those scenarios would lead to on externalist theories of justification. For 
example, in the Clairvoyant Brain Case, Susan’s combination of attitudes towards 
her dog experience and towards her unicorn experience seems irrational, because 
the dog seems to her just as real as the unicorn, the two experiences seem equally 
likely to be veridical, and she has no apparent reason for doubting either. All of 
this would render her combination of attitudes irrational only if these seemings 
were relevant to what Susan was justified in believing in roughly the way that 
Phenomenal Conservatism indicates—that is, if the dog’s seeming equally real as 
the unicorn conferred at least some sort of justification (in the absence of 
defeaters) for thinking that it was equally real, if the two experiences’ appearing 
equally likely to be veridical was some sort of prima facie justification for 
thinking that they were equally likely to be veridical, and so on. 
 It may seem that Phenomenal Conservatism is overly permissive, granting 
justification to a belief whenever the believer takes it to be justified, reliable, and 
so on. There are two reasons why this is not the case. First, what one believes to 
be the case need not be the same as what appears to one to be the case. In 
particular, cases of self-deception and accepting a proposition on faith are both 
plausibly regarded as cases in which one believes what does not appear to be the 
case; Phenomenal Conservatism thus is not committed to granting even prima 
facie justification in such cases. Second, Phenomenal Conservatism allows for a 
given belief’s relationship to other beliefs and appearances to impact its 
justification, whether positively or negatively. Thus, for example, a belief’s failure 
to cohere with the rest of a subject’s appearances and beliefs might deprive it of 
justification, even when the belief in question appears to the subject to be true. In 
such a case, the believer’s merely thinking that the belief that P coheres with the 
rest of his system of beliefs and appearances would not prevent his justification 
for P from being defeated, provided that the principle governing when a belief’s 
justification is defeated adverts to actual coherence relations (or lack thereof). 
 In short, it appears that the central intuitions supporting epistemic 
internalism support Phenomenal Conservatism in particular. In that sense, 
Phenomenal Conservatism is the paradigmatic form of internalism, and the form 
that externalists ought first and foremost to confront.15 
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Notes 
 
 
1See Fumerton (1988), Kim (1993) and Bergmann (1997) on the 
internalism/externalism controversy. Bergmann argues for construing the 
internalism/externalism debate as one concerning the nature of warrant, rather 
than justification. 
2This notion derives from Mackie (1980, pp. 61-2), who uses it to analyze 
causation. 
3The first three of these accounts are based on Fumerton’s (1995, pp. 60-66) 
characterizations of, respectively, internal state internalism, strong access 
internalism, and weak access internalism. BonJour (1985, p. 31) seems to endorse 
an internalist view along the lines of the Actual Awareness Account. Kim (1993, 
p. 305) is among the many who endorse the Introspectability Account. 
4This is a simplified version of Goldman’s (1992, pp. 123, 130) view. 
5See Huemer (2001, pp. 98-115) and (forthcoming) for discussion of this 
principle, where “it seems to S that p” and “it appears to S that p” are taken to 
report a distinct kind of propositional attitude, different from belief, which may be 
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termed an “appearance,” and which often causes one to adopt beliefs. Sensory 
experience, memory experience, introspective appearances, and intuitions are all 
species of appearances. 
 The present formulation of Phenomenal Conservatism differs from its 
original version in three respects. First, the phrase “at least some degree of” has 
been added to make clear that one need not have full justification for belief merely 
by having, for example, a weak and wavering appearance. Second, Phenomenal 
Conservatism is now treated as a principle governing justification in general, 
rather than specifically non-inferential justification. Thanks to Michael Tooley, 
who endorses neither version of the principle, for pointing out the need for such 
revisions. 
6In addition, as Fumerton (1995, p. 80-82) and Alston (1988, p. 271) observe, the 
actual awareness requirement generates an infinite regress. Briefly, assuming that 
actual awareness of a condition entails justified belief that the condition obtains, 
the actual awareness account implies that, if one justifiedly believe that p, one 
must also have a justified belief that some condition, C(p), on one’s being 
justified in believing p obtains; but then one must also have a justified belief that 
some condition, C(C(p)), on one’s being justified in believing that C(p) obtains, 
obtains; and so on. 
7
Nothing here turns on the apparent silliness of purple unicorns; to Susan, purple 
unicorns seem no sillier than dogs, nor has she any more reason to be suspicious 
of purple unicorns than of dogs. 
8Since Reliabilism as defined above only provides a sufficient condition on 
justification, a reliabilist could also embrace some other sufficient condition—
perhaps even Phenomenal Conservatism. However, unless Reliabilism is at least 
sometimes the only sufficient condition on justification that a belief satisfies, there 
would be little point to holding the view—it would be a sufficient condition on 
justification that is never required to explain why any belief is justified. It is 
therefore fair to assume that it is possible to construct a case in which the relevant 
substitution instance of (iii) holds. 
9Goldman (1992, p. 134) seems to confirm this assessment, declaring unjustified 
the beliefs of victims of Cartesian demons. Though Goldman allows another, 
“weak” sense of justification in which such beliefs would be justified, it is his 
strong sense of justification that is pertinent here. His weak sense appears to be an 
internalist notion of justification. 
10The Clairvoyant Brain case may provide an objection to certain forms of 
internalism as well. BonJour (1985, pp. 41-5; 2000, pp. 28-9, 31-2) discusses a 
case in which an individual has reliable clairvoyant beliefs with no grounds either 
for believing or for disbelieving that they are reliable. BonJour finds it intuitive 
that the clairvoyant beliefs in his case are unjustified. If at the same time, one 
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affirms that perceptual beliefs are justified in the absence of grounds either for 
affirming or for denying their reliability, then one will be led to endorse an 
Absurd Speech in the Clairvoyant Brain case. For this reason, the internalist 
should not embrace this combination of views. Cf. Sosa’s (2000, p. 223) response 
to BonJour. 
 The Phenomenal Conservative will hold that both clairvoyant beliefs and 
perceptual beliefs, if based upon appropriate appearances, are prima facie 
justified. This is consistent with the admission that the background knowledge of 
typical actual humans largely defeats the justification that one would have for 
clairvoyant beliefs. 
11Strictly speaking, externalism does not entail that it is possible for a single 
subject to experience two such cases; it entails only that two possible subject-
proposition pairs, <S, p> and <T, q>, might be such that S is justified in believing 
p, T is not justified in believing q, and everything appears relevantly the same to S 
and T. But virtually any view that allows this will also allow for the possibility of 
such cases in which S=T. 
12Russell (1997) and Fumerton (1995, pp. 73-9) defend versions of the 
Acquaintance Theory. See Russell (1997, chapters 5, 10) on the possible objects 
of acquaintance. 
13See Williamson 2000, chapter 4, for a persuasive argument that people are 
fallible in their judgements about all types of mental states. 
14See Fumerton (1995, p. 77). The right hand side of the biconditional is not to be 
read as implying that the fact that p exists. There might be a fact “similar to the 
fact that p” even if p is false, just as there might be a “godlike being” even if there 
is no God. Though the biconditional could be rephrased in terms of similarity of 
propositions rather than of (would-be) facts, Fumerton’s actual view does not 
recognize the existence of false propositions (1995, pp. 73-4). One could also 
rephrase the view to speak of states of affairs, perhaps including merely possible 
states; the arguments following in the text would apply equally well to such a 
view. 
15I would like to thank the anonymous referees at American Philosophical 
Quarterly for helpful comments on this paper. 
